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The purpose of this thesis is to summarize some game
theoretical models which can be applied to situations of
conflict between two opponents.
Opponent one's objective is to guard a long and narrow
strait, with his high speed boats, against the other who
tries to cross.
The models considered are zero sum game models, games
with different payoff functions and a game with deadline
where the game must be terminated in a predetermined period
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to summarize some game
theoretical models for dealing with the following problem.
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a long and narrow strait where smuggling or
terror activity is taking place. A patrol unit (which shall
be called side A) patrols in order to catch the smugglers
or terrorists (side B) . Side A is equipped with speed boats
which have a search radar, communication units and all of
its boats are under one command. Side B consists of indi-
viduals with small motor boats which are hard to detect.
These motor boats do not have communication or radar. They
cross the strait at night, usually near their village or
near a place where there is a village on the other side.
Being near the shore their radar echo is shadowed by land
and they are impossible to detect. Therefore, they can
travel to a favorite crossing point without being detected
and then try to cross.
Although side A's boats are much faster, the fact that
the strait is long and narrow gives side B a chance to
cross successfully without being detected. Both sides
would like to use the "best" strategy. The best strategy
for side A is the strategy which will maximize the number
of boats captured from side B. Side B views the best
strategy as the strategy which maximizes the number of

trips per boat before capture. A measure of effectiveness
could be the probability that B's boat makes the trip.
Given a measure of effectiveness, side A would like to know
what will happen if certain operating conditions are
changed. In particular, he is concerned with how his
effectiveness and his best strategy are going to change
if he changes the number of patrol boats assigned to the
strait, or how they would change if he can have boats with
different detection capabilities. A would like to know
how to take into consideration intelligence and how to
determine the value of his intelligence according to the
results he achieves. Side B, after determining his measure
of effectiveness, would like to know the best strategy and
find out when the situation is too risky and therefore
should terminate for a period of time.
The fact that side A's boats are much faster and detection
of one of B's boats can be made only if it is far away from
shore enables A to catch B whenever he detects them. We
assume that there is not much traffic in the strait and
therefore when side A detects a boat, he always captures
it. Thus we shall consider the probability of detection
as a measure of effectiveness for side A.
B. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
In order to be able to determine a best strategy it is
convenient to define some mathematical models which will
describe the situation. We partition the strait into N
imaginary strips as shown in Figure 1.

In this paper we do not deal with the problem of
selecting the optimal number of strips. In practice it
will be a function of computation ability, the accuracy
desired and the boat's detection and speed capabilities.
It is assumed that within each strip the probability
that a patrol boat from A detecting one of B's boats is
constant. Computing these probabilities is not an easy
task since they depend upon such factors as radar charac-
teristic, weather conditions, target characteristic,
mutual speeds, etc. Some computational methods for this
case are presented in Refs. 2, 4, and 5.
C. SCOPE
In trying to come up with the "best" strategy we used a
game theory approach. We consider side A and B as two
opponents and assign payoff from B to A. In chapter 2
and 3 we associate the payoff with the conditional probabil-
ity that side A catches B. We assign a payoff of 1 if
A catches B, when B decides to cross, and if B crosses
successfully. Therefore, the value of the game is the
conditional expectation that A will catch B when B decides
to cross. Note that it is senseless to use the uncondi-
tional expected number of catches as the measure of
effectiveness since B has the option of not crossing at all
Chapter 4 deals with games with deadline where side B
must cross the strait during a certain period or he loses

the game. In this case we were able to relate the payoff
to the probability that A catches B rather than to the
conditional probability as before.
Chapter 4 defines the payoff from B to A as +1 if A
catches B and -1 if B crosses successfully. As a result
we get a recursive game and we find the value of the game
by solving a difference equation. The value of this game
can be considered as a measure of effectiveness. In order
to get the value of this game one has to know the condi-
tional expectations. These expectations can be obtained by
one of the models of chapter 2 or 3.

II. ZERO SUM GAME
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to be able to formulate this conflict as a
zero sum game we must assume that both opponents have
strictly opposite preferences. Side A strictly prefers
catching boats from side B and B prefers the opposite.
Side A's pure strategy is to allocate boats to a particular
set of strips. Side B's pure strategy is to cross in one
particular strip.




= Probability that A will detect B,
•* when A chooses to use his i th
pure strategy and B uses his j th.
We can consider P. . as the payoff to A, and by the assump-
tion of strictly opposite preference it is the loss to B.
Assuming that the game is played over and over again, a
mixed strategy is the proportion according to which each
player uses his pure strategies. In order to be able to
solve the game we must assume further that each player
wants to maximize his total payoff. Thus we can say that
each player tries to maximize his expected payoff function.
Since the number of pure strategies is finite, the sets
of mixed strategies are closed and bounded subsets of











These games are known to have at least one equilibrium
point and all equilibrium points have the same value,
called the value of the game. Since the payoff to A
represents the probability that A detects B when both use
some pure strategies, the value of the game is the pro-
portion of B's boats that A detects when both use their
best mixed strategies. Thus we can define the value of the
game as a measure of effectiveness for A and B.
B. ZERO SUM GAME ONE PATROL BOAT
Here we consider the case where
A (patroling force) has only one boat and
B (smugglers) can cross at strips 1,2 N,
Define the mixed strategies: Let a = (a,, . . ., aw )
,
b = (b,
, . . .
, b„) where
a. = probability that side A uses its pure strategy i;
b- = probability that side B uses its pure strategy j.
If we accept the assumptions made in section A, then by
the Minimax Theorem, the value of the game is given by:
(1) max min ^> a. P. b. = min max a. P. b. = V.
i i. 3 — i 1-: J
i j j i
This game is easily solved by linear programming [Ref . 3]
.
Side A as a player wants to maximize the value of the game.
He can do that if he plays a mixed strategy a* . By doing
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so he will get at least V no matter what B does (Von Newmann-
Morgenstern Theorem [Ref. 10]).
In particular, A will get V or more if B uses any of its
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Subtracting the first row of the constraint matrix from
any other row but the last yields a different form (PI)
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Using the same reasoning, we get a similar formulation for
B which is the dual of (PI) called (Dl) .
Min V
(Dl) s.t.
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C. ZERO SUM GAME, MORE THAN ONE PATROL BOAT
The model in section B can be extended by allowing
side A to have n boats. First we extend the definition of
pure strategy for A to be a particular allocation of his
boats
.
For example, if we have 10 strips and side A has three
boats a pure strategy is to allocate boat number 1 to
strip 1, boat number 2 to strip 3 and boat 3 to strip 5.
If side A had only one boat it would have only N pure
strategies. With n boats, however, side A has N pure
strategies. We can index these pure strategies by
i = 1, 2, N ; and we define a set I. which asso-> » > 1
ciates with each index i, a particular allocation of boats




















































A pure strategy indexed by i, therefore, refers to an
allocation of boats to strips according to I .
.
Define
P.. e Probability side A detects B when A uses his pure
ij ' *
strategy indexed by i and B crosses at j
.
p.. = Probability that A detects B with a boat assigned
to strip k according the set of allocations I .
.
Thus, it follows that
(2) Py = 1 -/\(1-Pkj )
for all
k e L
As in section B this game can be formulated using linear
programming. The method of solution remains the same but
the simplex algorithm or any other used will take more
calculation time because the number of rows is now N + 1
The number of columns is still N.
Side A has a mixed strategy consisting of N elements
where side B has a mixed strategy consisting of only N
elements. Expanding the number of boats for A does not
change the set of strategies for B but it changes con-
siderably the set for side A.
The value of the game, V, is the proportion of B boats
which are caught by A. One question of interest is the
marginal effect of providing an additional patrol boat
14

for side A. In order to answer this question one must
solve the game with n boats and then with n + 1 boats.
This is a painful process since the two games have dif-
ferent payoff matrices and different strategies. Another
interesting question is what happens if A's detection
capabilities change. The simple, but painful, way is to
formulate the problem again and to proceed from the begin-
ning. However, a revised solution can be obtained by
making pivots in the old basis from previous solution
[Ref. 3]. This is illustrated in the following example.
1 . Example 1
Consider a strait 100 miles long with 10 possible
crossing points. Side A has only one boat operating against























Note: Due to the strait geometry, the detection capability is
also a function of the place where B crosses.
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Both A and B would like to use their best strategies.
In addition, side A feels that the proportion of boats he
is catching now is not sufficient and he would like to
catch at least 30% of B's boats. He has two alternatives:
(1) to obtain another detection radar.




Since alternative 1, in general, is cheaper, he
would like to choose it if possible. Solving the problem
(using the PI formulation) for one boat, we get that the value
of the game is .1706. This means that A catches 17.06%
of B's boats when he uses the mixed strategy:




















.12557 a 1Q = .16860
Now if A has another detection unit on board, his
new detection capability P* . is given by:
(3) P*. = 1 - (1-P. .) (1-P. O = 2P.. - P?.





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 .96 .84 .36
2 .84 .96 .84 .36
3 .36 .84 .96 .84 .36
4 .36 .84 .96 .84 .19
5 .19 .84 .96 .75 .19
6 .19 .84 .96 .75
7 .75 .96 .64
8 .64 .96 .57
9 .57 .96 .57
10 .57 .96
Solving this game makes the proportion side A
catches with two detection units 23.22 per cent. Side A





















= .18259 a 10
= .15176
We see that although the effectiveness of the boat
almost doubled, side A's effectiveness increased only by
361. While the boat is more effective, its detection range
did not change. According to the formulation of the prob-
lem this effectiveness is not sufficient for A, who would
17

like to examine the possibility of having two boats in
the strait.
Now consider the case where side A has two boats
and let A,, denote the proportion of time that A assigns
boat one to strip k and boat two to strip 1. We have a
100 x 10 matrix if the two boats have different detection
capabilities, and a 55 x 10 matrix if they have identical
capabilities
.
Denote by P rv <M • the probability that B is
detected when A has boat one at k and boat two at 1 and
B is crossing at j. Thus,
w p (Mtj - 1 - u-V (1
-V
Solving this game yields a detection probability of .339
for side A. Therefore, side A can get 33.9 per cent of
B's boats if he uses the following mixed strategy.
Assign boat boat two
one to strip to strip Proportion









Having another identical boat does not double the probability
of a catch for side A as expected. The large increase indi-
cates a very poor coverage with a single boat.

D. ZERO SUM GAME WITH SOME KNOWLEDGE OF OPPONENT'S STRATEGY
The nature of a zero sum game is that it has a unique
equilibrium. If side A chooses the correct mixed strategy-
he is guaranteed to get at least the value of the game
regardless of what his opponent does. For a zero sum two
person game it can be shown that side B cannot get more than
minus the value of the game if he plays any strategy when
A uses his optimum strategy. Now consider the case where
side A has some knowledge of what side B is doing. If
side B plays its best strategy, then side A cannot gain by
changing his strategy according to the information he has.
Side A can gain only if he has information on what side
B does and side B does not play according to its best
strategy. Obviously, if A has information on time and
location of side B shipments, then he intercepts B. On
the other hand, he might have some information on proba-
bilities associated with the way B uses some pure strategies
If we have information of the second type we can include
this information as constraints in the L.P. formulation
[Ref. 4].
1. Example 2
Consider Example 1; and assume that side A has
only one ship, but with additional information. He knows
that side B is twice as likely to go in strip number 5
than in number 1 or 10. He also knows that less than half
the time side B will go through strip number 4, 5, 6, 7.
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Note that the problems for A and B are dual problems, and
the value for both sides must be the same since the game
is a zero sum game.













E. LIMITATIONS OF ZERO SUM GAME
The zero sum game formulation to this problem is
computationally simple, since equilibrium points exist
and the value of the game is unique. There are some limi-
tations, however, that must be considered. By modeling a
conflict situation as a zero sum game, one assumes that
both opponents see the same payoff function and their
preferred alternatives are strictly opposite. In our case
of patrol boats and smugglers we assumed some detection
function and the payoff was the probability of a patrol
boat detecting a smuggler. It is not always true that
smugglers know the detection capabilities of the patrol,
and in most cases smugglers know very little about this.
The minimax solution of such a game provides an optimal
solution against an opponent's optimal strategy, and if the
opponent deviates from his "best" strategy the solution
does not indicate how to take advantage of his mistake.
The minimax solution was derived assuming complete lack
of knowledge about the opponent's strategy in any specific play




III. DIFFERENT PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
A. DIFFERENT PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
In Chapter 2 we assumed that both side A and side B
see the same payoff function which made it a zero sum
game. One of the disadvantages of this approach is that
side B does not always know the detection capabilities
of side A. Thus side B can assume some detection capa-
bilities of side A boats or he may randomize his behavior
by having a uniform distribution over all crossing points.
If side B chooses to assume some detection capabilities on
side A, we can construct a table with entries of the proba-
bility that B perceptually will cross successfully in
strip j when side A's boat is in strip i. Now each side
will observe his probability matrix and try to get the
best strategy thinking that his payoff matrix is the true
payoff matrix. If we assume that each side will think
that the other side knows the "true" payoff matrix each
will use a mixed strategy that will guarantee him the
value of the game. Therefore, side A will not change his
strategy (denote a*). Side B, assuming a payoff matrix P~
will solve the game and determine a strategy b which is
different from b* (strategy of side B when he knows the
payoff matrix P_ of side A). Side A will get a payoff
v = a* P-. b >_ a* P-,b*, where a denotes "a transpose."
23

B. STRATEGY AGAINST OPPONENT WITH RANDOM BEHAVIOR
As stated in section A it is difficult for side B to
know the detection capabilities of side A. Without infor-
mation, side B might assume it is uniform and, therefore,
in order to minimize his risk use equal probabilities for
each crossing point. Thus, if we have N crossing points,
the probability that side B will cross at one of them is
1/N. If side A knows it, he might use this information in
order to maximize his expectation. As before we use
linear programming to calculate the expected value for side A,
1
N
max V - v "^ w •N j=1 J
s. t.
N
~S~ a p |£—x 1 i- +o). - V > for every i1=1 3 3 ~ . J
(P3)
2- p. = iw 1
We get this information by recalling that the problem of







*S~ P. b.-V < for every i
3=1 J J
(D3) b. = i
N
Z. b. - 1
j=l J
Now we can convert the primal problem to the form which
is easily solved by the simplex method by subtracting the
first line from the others.
1 . Example 3
Consider Example 1, but side A knows that side B
intends to use a uniform strategy. The problem then becomes
N
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Solving this problem on the IBM 360/67 we get that the payoff
is 0.23 which corresponds to side A remaining at strip 3 all
the time. The value of the information to side A is .23 -
.1706 = .0594, or he increased his efficiency by 35% by
having this information about B.
Note
In this case we could solve the problem without using L.P.
since we know that side B is equally likely to cross at
any point, side A allocates his boat to the strip where he
has the largest probability of catching B.
C. CONCLUSION
Whenever side B deviates from his max min strategy,
side A is guaranteed to have at least the previous payoff
and in most cases he will have more. When side B has
wrong ideas about side A detection capabilities, this must
reduce his payoff. If side B deviates from his max min
strategy (side B uses a uniform strategy} and if side A
has this information, then side A can use it to increase
his payoff. In general, any information one side has on
the other side is very helpful and although we calculate
the min max or max min payoff which is the guaranteed
payoff, additional information can increase the payoff
for side A (or decrease it for him) significantly.
Both sides, therefore, can benefit from using information




IV. GAME WITH A DEADLINE
We now consider a conflict situation which is limited
by time. Such a case arises when smugglers (side B) have
perishable items, or intelligence which must be delivered
within a certain time period; otherwise they become of no
value.
A. GAME WITH A DEADLINE, ONE PATROL BOAT, ONE SMUGGLER BOAT
Denote the period by M (i.e., the smugglers have M
nights to cross the strait). Assume that B must cross the
strait only once in the period M in order to succeed. Side
A (patrol boat) has only one boat and due to limited
resources can use it only for k nights, where k < M. We
assume at least initially that both sides know M and k.
Each night both side A and side B make a decision to go to
sea or not to go.
Let I\ denote the value of the game on the n day























(1) If side A and side B both decide to go, side A
has some probability of catching side B. This probability
can be determined from a zero sum game (see Chapter II)
or any other way.
(2) If side B goes but side A does not, B wins and we
say the payoff to A is -1.
(3) If side A goes but not side B,then side A loses one
available day.
(4) If both do not go, one day is gone from the period
and side A has as many available days as before.
For this type of game as shown in Table 3 one can
show that the value of the game is given by the following
recursive equation [Ref. 10, p. 173]:
(5)
,n






with the boundary conditions
=
-1 and r = v , for every n >
o n ' }
Note that for the last period (n=l) , the game matrix has
the form: side B
Side A
where |v | < 1. By dominance, side B must choose the go
go no go
go V 1
no go -1 1
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strategy which implies he always chooses to go on the last
period if he didn't do it before. Now if side A has n
available days he will use them all. Then each day he has
a payoff v if side B goes. But since we know that B
will go, the value of the game then is v. If side A has
more than n available days he can use at most n because
he has only one boat.
The solution of the difference equation is given by
the following:
Theorem
The solution of the recursive game described above is:
fM rn - k ( v+1 ) - n
Proof
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If side A uses a mixed strategy where x, denotes the
probability to go when there are n nights left and side A
has k available days remaining, the optimal "go" probability
for side A is found by solving:
n , ri n. k(v+l)-n




k ^ k' n





Similarly, for side B using mixed strategy with "go"
nprobability y,
:
n ri n, ,(k-l) (v+l)-(n-l). k(v+l)-n
yk











Thus, we conclude that in order to get the value of
the game, side A must allocate his available days so the
probability that he will go is equal to the ratio of the
number of search periods available to A to the total
number of remaining periods.
For side B, a uniform probability distribution over
the remaining period will give him the value of the game.
This probability is independent of the number of available
days which side A has.
Knowing the value of the game r ,, we can calculate
the probability that A catches B by
F k
+ 1




Consider a game where in any period if side A
allocates a boat and side B decides to go, side A gets
a payoff of 0.5. There are 10 days left to the end of
the period and side A has only six available days.




= yq = . 6 and y, = 1/10, respectively.
The value of the game is
r






If A and B did not go, we have a new game where
Therefore
v=.5 k = 6 n=9.
9 6 AA7x A = 77 = . 6676 9
9 1







B. GAME WITH DEADLINE, TWO PATROL BOATS, ONE SMUGGLER BOAT
Consider now the situation where side A has two boats,
one capable of doing k, and the second k patrol days during
the period.
Case 1
Suppose the two boats are identical and side A can
allocate his boats according to some optimal plan. If
he allocates one boat he gets V? and if he allocates two he
gets V~ . Side A now has three alternatives and the game



















no boat -1 r 1
in-l
and on the last day of the period:
(v* if k > 2
r^ = n V* if k = 1
I -1 if k =
Note
(1) The fact that the two boats of side A are identical
allows us to lump together the remaining available search
period for each boat.





one boat V* + 1
no boat -1 +1
Side B always chooses the dominant go strategy.






V 2' n-l'Vl ' n-r
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where f is the recursive relation, and one must solve a
3x2 game. Usually this is done by formulating an LP
program, but in this game we find its value graphically













n-l (1_y) - v
i y + r*_! d-y) < v
where r is the value of the game in period n when side A
n & r
has a total of k available days.
Figure 3
In Figure 3 we see a typical graphic solution. It is
always true that V£ > V* > -1 and
p-K pK
_L . pK - Z
n-1 — n-1 — n-1
or there could not be dominance.
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A solution is the highest point of intersection of
two lines or intersection of all three lines or if there
are two solutions any convex combination is also a
solution.
Although we cannot find an explicit form for r , we
can solve the recursive relations for known values of
V* and V*.
Case 2
Suppose now that the two boats are not identical. We
can define V? , V* and V** as expected payoffs when boat
number one, boat number two or both are out according to
some optimal allocation.
ki k?
Let r ' be the value of the game played when n
periods are left and side A has k, available days for boat
number one and k~ for the other boat. This is a 4 x 2
game with matrix:
go no go
























kl,k 2 Vl i£ k l - X k 2
1












0,k 2 , ki,0
T and r means the corresponding rows must
n n t- e
be eliminated from the game matrix.
ki,k2
As stated in Case 1 the value of r as a function
n
ki,k? ki-l,k? ki ,k?-l




' 2 n- 1 ' n-1 n-1
found numerically by linear programming or by graphic
solution.
Case 3
As a final case we point out the situation where
side A has n boats of different types. In principle it
is the same problem as Case 2, only the game matrix now
is 2 x 2. One has to define all combinations of payoffs
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